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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of labor market institutions (LMI) on business cycle
(BC) synchronization. We ﬁrst develop a two-country right-to-manage model of wage bar-
gaining. We ﬁnd that, following a symmetric demand change, cross-country diﬀerences in
LMI generate divergent responses in employment and output. We then investigate the em-
pirical relevance of this result using panel data of 20 OECD countries observed over 40 years.
Our estimation strategy controls for a large set of possible factors inﬂuencing GDP correla-
tions, which allows to confront our results with those found in previous studies. Consistently
with our theoretical results, we ﬁnd that similar labor markets across countries tend to favor
more their synchronized cycles. In particular, disparities in tax wedges yields lower GDP
co movement. Besides, interactions between labor market institutions do matter, enhanc-
ing or dampening the eﬀect of tax wedge divergence on BC synchronization. Our overall
results suggest that the impact of distortions in demand-supply labor mechanism should be
investigated in international business cycle models.
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11 Introduction
What drives international GDP comovement ? The extensive empirical literature on this topic
has not reached a consensus yet. Frankel and Rose (1998) stress that trade matters. They present
empirical evidence that higher bilateral trade is associated with more correlated business-cycles.
Imbs (2004), Imbs (2001a) and Imbs (2001b) highlight another channel linked to similarity in
industrial structure, while Engel and Rose (2002) stress the role of currency unions. Darvas, Rose,
and Szarpary (2005) investigate the role of ﬁscal divergence across countries. They conclude that
countries with similar budget positions tend to have more correlated business cycles. Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005) empirically investigate the robustness of such various variables. They ﬁnd
that all are considered as signiﬁcant determinants of business-cycle comovement. However, when
all variables are included in the regression, only a few of them are robust, namely bilateral trade
consistently with Frankel and Rose’s (1998) results. They deny a signiﬁcant role to industrial
similarity and currency unions, contrasting results are obtained by Imbs (2001a) and Engel and
Rose (2002).
The question of what drives business cycle comovement remains an open issue. Our paper
takes part to the debate. Its originality lies in assessing the impact of similarity in labor market
institutions (LMI hereafter) on GDP cross-country correlation. If business cycles in OECD
countries have been inﬂuenced by factors that are likely to favor comovement (trade and ﬁnancial
integration), one cannot neglect the potential role of other factors that may cause them to
evolve diﬀerently. In this respect, one striking feature is the heterogeneity in the labor market
regulations across OECD countries. Since the ﬁrst oil shock in 1973, continental Europe, Japan
and the USA have indeed evolved very diﬀerently regards their labor markets, which has called
for diﬀerent labor market policies. The empirical literature on determinants of international BC
has not investigated this point.
International macroeconomic theory highlights the impact of labor market institutions on
cross-country correlations. In Mundell’s (1961) optimum currency area, member countries adjust
to asymmetric shocks if workers are able and willing to move freely to other countries and if
wages are ﬂexible. Even if a single currency adoption often makes countries become gradually
more alike, thus becoming itself more optimal (Frankel and Rose (1998)), disparity in LMI could
hamper this convergence. Mundell (1961) addresses the normative implications of the issue, with
the question of the “good” (and bad) labor market institutions. Mundell calls for a greater labor
market ﬂexibility, an orientation also adopted by OECD (1994) and reaﬃrmed in OECD (2005).
The question we address here is not normative but positive: how does similarity in labor market
regulations aﬀect business cycle comovement?
The objective of the paper is twofold. First, we are particularly interested in the link be-
tween similarity in labor market regulations and business-cycle comovement. We thus develop a
WS-PS model in a two-country setting to highlight the mechanisms through which diﬀerences in
2LMI aﬀect business cycle synchronization. The partial equilibrium model extends Belot and Van
Ours’s (2004) right-to-manage model to an open economy framework. It shows that, following a
symmetric demand change, cross-country diﬀerences in LMI generate divergent responses in em-
ployment and output. We then evaluate the empirical relevance of this result. For our empirical
results to be convincing, we gauge whether they are robust to the inclusion of other potential
determinants of BC comovement. Our second and related objective is therefore to evaluate the
robustness of the various candidates of BC synchronization found in previous empirical works.
The estimations are based on data covering 20 industrialized countries over the period 1964-
2003. Our estimation strategy puts into perspective the results obtained by Imbs (2004) and
Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), that use cross-section analysis, hereby discarding the speciﬁc
time-varying dimension in their data. This is a serious limit of the methodology as it is likely
to give spurious interpretations of the coeﬃcients associated with control variables, in particular
when covering such a long time horizon. In contrast with these papers, we estimate the eﬀects of
LMI similarity on BC synchronization by exploiting time series variation as well as cross-sectional
variance, as in Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005). With respect to this paper, we consider a
larger set of control variables.
Our empirical results suggest that cross-country divergence in LMI reduces BC synchroniza-
tion, notably diﬀerences in tax wedges. Moreover, in line with the conclusions drawn by Belot
and Van Ours (2004) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) on employment performances, we ﬁnd
that interactions between LMI do matter. Moreover, we ﬁnd that interactions between LMI
aﬀect the single eﬀect of tax wedge divergence on BC synchronization. In the particular case
of the Euro zone, our overall results then give support to the view that harmonization in labor
market institutions can ease the conduct of monetary policy within the area. With respect to
the other determinants of BC synchronization, we ﬁnd that industrial similarity does not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect GDP comovement as in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). In addition, trade matters.
However, the relevant trade measure in explaining GDP comovement is similarity in imported
goods. Our results also support Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005)’s conclusions on the role of
ﬁscal convergence in generating more synchronized cycles.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents our dataset and descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we present our estimation
strategy and the results of our benchmark regressions. They conﬁrm that LMI matter in business
cycle synchronization. In particular, disparity in tax wedges yields lower GDP comovement. In
Section 5, we explore the role of interactions between LMI in accounting for BC comovement.
Section 6 concludes.
32 A two-country model with right-to-manage wage bargaining
This section studies how cross-country diﬀerences in LMI may aﬀect national labor market equi-
libria, thereby inducing asymmetric responses in output. We extent the partial-equilibrium
closed-economy model developed by Belot and Van Ours (2004) to a two-country setting. In a
right-to-manage model of wage bargaining, they establish the link between LMI and the equi-
librium levels of wage and employment. Our modelling is quite similar to theirs on this point,
hence we do not go through the analytical derivation of the WS-PS model in order to focus on
the open economy dimension.
2.1 WS-PS in an open economy
Country 1 (country 2 respectively) is referred to as the “domestic country” (“foreign” respectively).
In what follows, we focus on country 1. The situation in country 2 may be inferred by symmetry,
since we assume that both countries are similar. They diﬀer only on the calibration of their LMI.
The right-to-manage model of wage bargaining relies on the assumption that wages are set by
a bargaining process between a union and a ﬁrm, so as to maximize the relative surplus of both
players. In each country i = {1,2}, there are a number ni ﬁrms in monopolistic competition
(assumed to be symmetric), and ni unions. Each union negotiates wages with one ﬁrm, the
bargaining process being independent of the other unions and ﬁrms. The bargaining process can
occur at various levels (ﬁrm-level, industry-level or national-level). The case when ni = 1 is the
situation in which wage negotiations are centralized at the national level.
In each country, ﬁrms are in monopolistic competition in the production of diﬀerentiated
ﬁnal goods. We abstract from capital in the model to derive analytical solutions. Output y1(z)
produced by a ﬁrm z in country 1 is given by the following Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation:
y1(z) = l1(z)α (1)
with l1(z) the employment level in ﬁrm z (in country 1), and 0 < α < 1. Each domestic ﬁrm z
faces the following demand for its good coming from both countries:
yd
1(z) = p1(z)−ηCW (2)
where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties and CW is an exogenous parameter
that represents aggregate demand at the world level.1 The optimizing problem may be decom-
posed into two steps. First, the wage level is negotiated within each union-ﬁrm pair. Secondly,
given the resulting wage level, each ﬁrm optimally determines its labor demand. The problem is
solved backwards.
1The demand function for good z results from the household’s standard optimizing problem with CES prefer-
ences (see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).
4(PS) curve Firm z (in country 1) determines its employment level and its sale price so as to
maximize its proﬁts :
max
p1(z),l1(z)
π1(z) = p1(z)y1(z) − w1(z)(1 + τ1 + f1)l1(z)
given equations (1) and (2). w1(z) is the negotiated wage in ﬁrm z and τ1 the labor tax rate.
In addition, the ﬁrm has to incur ﬁring costs per worker w1f1. Taking ﬁrst-order conditions
and imposing symmetry between ﬁrms within a country, we get the following Price Setting (PS)








with µ = 1 − α(1 − η). µ represents the eﬀective degree of ﬁrms monopoly power, determining
the magnitude of the price mark-up on wage costs. Equation (3) determines a labor demand
curve as a decreasing function of the negotiated wage. Besides, an increase in aggregate demand
(CW goes up) results in an increased production, hence, a higher labor demand in country 1. A
similar expression holds in country 2.
(WS) curve Both countries solve their union-ﬁrm bargaining. In country 1, the wage level in
ﬁrm z is determined according to a Nash-bargaining process between the ﬁrm and a union, so











β1 0 < β1 < 1 (4)
with Ω
f
1(z) the rent of ﬁrm z, Ωe
1(z) the rent of a worker hired by ﬁrm z, and β1 the bargaining
power of unions, assuming symmetry across unions and across ﬁrms within a country. Belot and
Van Ours (2004) provide a detailed analytical resolution of the problem. Using the symmetry





















b1 is the beneﬁt replacement ratio that intervenes as the worker’s outside option in the Nash-
bargaining process, and q is the exogenous job destruction rate, assumed to be similar across
countries. l1 is the equilibrium employment level resulting from the ﬁrm optimal decisions. It is
perfectly anticipated at this step, given that both players are assumed to be perfectly informed











As shown by equation (5), the negotiated wage is an increasing function of β1, n1 and b1,
whereas it decreases with f1. Higher β1, n1 or b1 give workers a better outside option in the
5wage bargaining process, leading to a higher negotiated wage value. The opposite reasoning
holds for ﬁring costs f1.
Employment and output Wage bargaining (equation (5)) and labor demand (equation (3))
simultaneously determine the labor market equilibrium in each country i = 1,2, that is (wi,Li),
with Li the sum of all individual labor demands of ﬁrms in country i. In a symmetric equilibrium,

















For a given CW, the bargaining power (β), the eﬀective degree of ﬁrms monopoly power
(µ), the labor tax rate (τ), and the beneﬁt replacement ratio (b) have a negative eﬀect on the
equilibrium employment level, while ﬁring cost (f) have an ambiguous eﬀect. Indeed, high values
of β and b, by raising workers’ outside option, lead to a higher negotiated wage, which reduces
optimal labor demand and the resulting equilibrium employment level. Similarly, for a given
negotiated wage, a heavy tax rate τ reduces labor demand (equation (3)). Firing costs f have an
ambiguous impact on employment. On the one hand, for a given negotiated wage, they increase
the ﬁrms labor cost, hence reducing optimal labor demand (PS eﬀect, equation (3)). On the other
hand, they strengthen the ﬁrm’s bargaining power in the wage negotiation, leading to a reduced
negotiated wage level (WS eﬀect, equation (5)). Finally, one can show that the employment level
decreases with n (see Belot and Van Ours (2004)).
Equation (7) also shows that labor market institutions interact with each other, as the impact
of any LMI parameter on employment is aﬀected by the values taken by the other labor market
regulations. As in Belot and Van Ours (2004), any LMI that depresses the level of employment
also reduces its sensitivity to another LMI change. For instance, the employment eﬀect of a
change in labor tax τ is reduced if the country is characterized by strong trade unions (high β)
or generous unemployment beneﬁts (high b).
Aggregate output is Yi = niyi with yi given by equation (1). In the centralized case, domestic
aggregate production Y1 is given by:
Y1|n1=1 =














A similar expression holds in the foreign country. Equation (8) therefore establishes the link
between LMI and national equilibrium output, for a given value of aggregate demand CW.
62.2 The impact of an exogenous change in demand
Do divergence in LMI lowers cross-country comovement? In that section, we address the question
using the theoretical framework described in the previous sections. To that aim, we analyze the
eﬀects of an increase in the demand for goods that aﬀects both countries. The only source of
asymmetry comes from LMI. In that context, we show that divergence in labor market institu-
tions causes economies to respond diﬀerently, even after a common shock.
We adopt a partial-equilibrium approach by modelling the common shock through an exoge-
nous increase in CW. The (WS)-(PS) system (equation (3), aggregated at the national level, and
equation (5)) is then suﬃcient to determine the equilibrium values of wi and Li in each country
i = 1,2. Aggregate output is derived from equation (1). In order to simplify the exposition of
the model, we examine the eﬀects of the demand shock in the case of centralized wage bargain-
ing. Our results are not qualitatively modiﬁed with ni > 1. The magnitude of the employment

























Equation (9) shows that the employment response to the common demand shock depends on
the country-speciﬁc LMI (β, τ, b and f). In particular, it is larger when the union bargaining
power β, the labor tax τ and unemployment beneﬁts b are low. As well (and summarizing Belot
and Van Ours’s results), the lower degree of centralization in wage bargaining (i.e., the higher
n), the lower the employment level. In contrast, the eﬀect of ﬁring costs f is ambiguous.
Interaction between LMI also matter in the way economies adjust to the common shock.
Consider for instance countries that diﬀer in their tax wedges. According to equation (9), the
magnitude of the employment change in the high tax rate country is more limited than in the
low tax rate country. This implies some divergence in employment and output responses across
countries, thereby reducing BC comovement. Besides, if, for instance, the unions’ bargaining
power is strong in both countries (β1 and β2 high), then the change in employment (following the
common shock) is limited in both countries (equation (9)). In that context, following the demand
shock, the cross-country divergent responses in employment and output due to heterogeneity in
tax rates is reduced. This economic mechanism suggests to investigate the empirical role of
interactions between LMI in the business cycle synchronization. This is done in Section 5.
In a two-country framework, equation (9) shows that the magnitude of the employment
increase to a world demand change is more limited in the country with the most “rigid” labor
market (high b, τ or β). As a result, a common demand shock yields a lower international
output correlation when countries diﬀer in their LMI. Figure 1 illustrates the underlying economic
mechanisms following a change in world demand, when countries diﬀer in the labor tax τ in the
centralized case. The calibration of structural parameters is reported in Table 1.
7Given Basu and Fernald’s mark-up estimates, the elasticity of substitution across varieties η is
set equal to 6. α is based on Kydland and Prescott (1982). Following Campolmi and Faia (2006),
we set β = 0.5. The exogenous job destruction rate q is based on Kraus and Lubik (2003). The
beneﬁt replacement ratio b is calibrated so as to match mean value in OECD countries (based on
data provided by Nickell (2006), and later used in our database). The value of f is set equal to
0.4 (that is the mean value of dismissals indices in OECD countries provided by Botero, Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004)). Asymmetry in LMI is introduced through tax
rates. In the “ﬂexible” country 1, we set τ1 = 0.33, while in the “rigid” country 2, we set τ2 = 0.57,
so as to mimic the tax wedge values in the US and France respectively, based on data for OECD
countries provided by Nickell and Nunziata (2001).2
Figure 1: Comparative statics analysis
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Consider ﬁrst the labor market equilibrium before the change in aggregate demand. Given
that wage bargaining is set at the centralized level, and that the LMI entering the wage setting
process are similar across countries (equation (5)), the (WS) curve is identical in the two countries
and deﬁnes an unique negotiated wage level, independent of the employment level ((WS) is
horizontal in Figure 1). Divergence in tax rates only aﬀect labor demand. As shown by equation
(7), a higher tax rate reduces labor demand. The resulting equilibrium employment level is lower
in country 2 (point A2) than in country 1 (point A1).
Consider now the eﬀect of a positive demand change (dCW > 0), that is identical in both
countries. The demand change shifts labor demand (PS) upward. In the high-tax rate economy
(country 2), ﬁrms are more reluctant to adjust the positive demand shock through quantities.
As a consequence, the magnitude of the increase in labor demand is more limited in country 2 in
2To be consistent with the empirical analysis, calibration is based on tax wedge rather than on the employer’s
tax rate. Using the employer’s tax rate would not qualitatively aﬀect our results since France is still considered
as more rigid than the US, according to the database on employer’s tax provided by Nickell (2006).
8spite of a common shock (labor level goes up from A2 to B2). Employment and output increases
are consequently more limited in the rigid economy than in the ﬂexible economy (∆L1 > ∆L2
as shown in Figure 1).
This analysis illustrates that employment hence output responses diﬀer across countries be-
cause of divergence in LMI, even in case of common demand changes. Heterogeneity in LMI can
actually lead to even more divergent output responses when exogenous changes are asymmetric
across countries. The WS - PS model conﬁrms our intuition that divergent LMI reduce GDP
comovement. However, endogenous trade balance adjustments could reduce the magnitude of
this eﬀect. In a general equilibrium setting, diﬀerences in output responses indeed aﬀect trade
balances, hence terms of trade. Changes in terms of trade favor the demand for good produced
in one country and lowers the demand for good produced by the other (expenditure switching
eﬀect). As a result, taking into account responses of international relative prices could reduce
or enhance the divergence in output due to asymmetric LMI. This calls for an empirical investi-
gation to assess whether similar LMI strengthen output comovement or not. This is done in the
next sections.
3 Do labor market institutions aﬀect GDP comovement? A ﬁrst
look
3.1 Description of the dataset
We use a panel of 20 OECD countries observed throughout 40 years, from 1964 to 2003. The
complete list of countries is provided in Appendix A. The data is split into four decades (1964-73,
1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003) yielding a sample of 760 observations and 190 country pairs. Data
sources and descriptive statistics of key variables are provided in Appendices B and C.
Business cycle synchronization is captured by the GDP cross-country correlations (denoted
ρy), as standard in the International Business Cycle literature. We use quarterly GDP time series
from BSDB OECD database (1964:1-2003:4). GDP business cycle is identiﬁed using Hodrick
and Prescott’s (1997) ﬁlter. The theoretical framework (Section 2) identiﬁes the role of various
dimensions of the labor market functioning that are likely to aﬀect BC comovement. In our
empirical analysis, they are captured by the following set of variables:
• Employment protection laws (epl) consists of laws, regulations and administrative deci-
sions that constrain the contractual conditions under which a worker can be dismissed.
Employment protection laws are considered to be a key factor in generating labor mar-
ket inﬂexibility. They may be considered as a proxy for the ﬁring costs f in the model
developed in Section 2.
• Net Union Density (udnet) measures the share of workers that are union members. It is
intended to capture union bargaining power, that is β in the model of Section 2, similarly
9as Belot and Van Ours (2004).3
• Bargaining Coordination (co) refers to mechanisms whereby the aggregate employment
implications of wage determination are taken into account when wage bargains are struck.
This may be achieved if wage bargaining is highly centralized or if there are institutions,
such as employers’ federations, which can assist bargainers to act in concert even when
bargaining itself ostensibly occurs at the level of the ﬁrm or industry. This variable captures
the role of n in the model (a higher degree of coordination corresponding to a lower value
of n).
• Gross Beneﬁt Replacement Rate (brr) as percent of working wage captures the degree of
generosity of the unemployment insurance system. Beneﬁt Replacement Rates come from
OECD data.
• Tax Wedge (tw) is interpreted as taxes that constitutes the wedge between the real product
wage (labor costs per employee normalized on the output price) and the real consumption
wage (after tax pay normalized on the consumer price index). We interpret this variable
as capturing the role of τ in the model of Section 2.
For all LMI indicators, we investigate the impact of their cross-country divergence on business
cycle synchronization. This divergence is captured by the absolute diﬀerence in labor institutions
such that:
DiffLabori,j,t = |Labori,t − Laborj,t| (10)
where Labori,t = epli,t, udneti,t, coi,t, brri,t or twi,t in country i, and the equivalent in country
j. A higher value is interpreted as a larger diﬀerence in LMI at the beginning of each decade t.
3.2 Descriptive statistics analysis
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics of LMI variables
To gauge whether cross-country diﬀerences in LMI aﬀect GDP comovement, we ﬁrst check that
there is indeed some heterogeneity in LMI across the OECD countries of our sample. To that
aim, Table 2 (top panel) reports a summary of the distribution across countries of our measures
of labor market regulation.4 It conﬁrms a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the OECD LMI,
3Note that in some OECD countries, results of bargaining between ﬁrms and unions are extended to non-union
ﬁrms and employees. A low value of union density does not necessarily indicate a weak power of trade unions in
that case. As underlined by Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005), union density only tells one part of the story,
an element that one has to keep in mind when interpreting related results.
In addition, we proxy unions’ power (β) and centralization in bargaining (n) using union density and the
coordination degree index respectively. Belot and Van Ours (2004) provide panel data on union coverage and
centralization degree but not for all countries in our sample. We consequently do not include these variables in
the database.
4As detailed below, for each LMI it is the 1994-value that happens in the regressions (associated with decade
4). As a result, the LMI series (on a yearly basis) used in the descriptive statistics end in 1995.
10as shown by the strong dispersion around the mean for each LMI variable. Figure 2 conﬁrms the
large degree of variability in LMI across countries, by reporting the mean value of employment
protection laws and tax wedge (over the whole period) for each country in the sample.

























































Next, we investigate the question of evolution of LMI over time. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 2 (bottom panel). Most LMI evolve over time, union density and the degree
of coordination of wage bargaining exhibiting a lower degree of variability.5 Evidence of time-
variability in the labor market institutions thus supports our choice of implementing data-panel
analysis, rather than in cross-section as Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). A closer look at the data
reveals that employment protection laws and tax pressure have changed substantially over the
past decades. This is illustrated in Figure 3, that reports the yearly mean value of employment
protection laws and tax wedge over the sample of countries. Both variables have been increasing
since the beginning of the 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s to further decrease, notably tax
wedge.
3.2.2 A ﬁrst look at the relation between LMI similarity and GDP comovement
Does similarity in LMI enhance business cycle synchronization? We ﬁrst address the question
using descriptive statistics. Among the group of 20 countries, we identify some that may be
qualiﬁed as “ﬂexible” and others as “rigid”.6 We then determine the cross-country GDP correla-
tion over the period 1964 - 2003, for the whole set of countries and by country group. Results
are displayed in Table 3.
In column I, we report the mean GDP correlation for the whole set of 20 countries. Columns
5As a result, one should keep in mind that the inclusion of a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect in the regression may
capture the eﬀects of these two variables and make them insigniﬁcant in the regressions.
6The “ﬂexible” group consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom. The “rigid”
group includes Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden. This partition is based on a principal component
analysis, that builds a synthetic LMI indicator as a linear combination of various LMI for each country.











































II and III present the same statistics, but obtained on a subset of countries with a similar
functioning of the labor market (the group of “ﬂexible” countries (column II) and the group of
“rigid” countries (column III). In column IV, we make the opposite experiment by calculating the
mean correlation between two countries with divergent LMI. Countries with a similar functioning
of the labor market, either rigid or ﬂexible, have more correlated business cycles than countries
with divergent LMI. Results displayed in Table 3 comfort our intuition that LMI matter in
business cycle synchronization.
Which LMI dimension mostly aﬀect business cycle comovement? Table 4 presents the cor-
relation between GDP comovement and cross-country divergence for each of our LMI variables,
calculated over the whole period (on a decade-basis), all countries included. Disparity in tax
pressure, in employment protection laws and in bargaining coordination signiﬁcantly reduce the
cross-country GDP correlation, the other variables are insigniﬁcant.
4 Estimation strategy and empirical results
Descriptive statistics analysis comforts us in our focus on the role of divergence in LMI on
business cycle comovement. We now investigate the robustness of these preliminary results using
panel estimation.
4.1 Speciﬁcation of the benchmark equation
The benchmark regression is written as:
ρ
y




i,j,t the cross country correlation of HP ﬁltered GDP between country i and country j
over decade t.
• DiffLabori,j,t the absolute diﬀerence in LMI between countries i and j.
• Xi,j,t a set of other variables that are likely to aﬀect business cycle synchronization. Ap-
pendix B provides a full description of Xi,j,t data.
• ωi,j,t captures elements that inﬂuence GDP correlation, beyond the impact of LMI and
Xi,j,t variables, including time and country pair dummies as detailed below.
The paper aims at measuring how divergence in LMI aﬀect international GDP correlations.
As suggested by our theoretical model (Section 2) and descriptive statistics analysis (Section 3.2),
we expect γ to be negative as more similar labor markets favor bilateral activity comovement.
However, in order to evaluate the robustness of the relationship, we need to check two elements
related to the potential endogeneity between these variables. First, it has to be the case that the
eﬀect captured by diﬀerences in LMI is not attributable to an omitted variable that would lead
to the same observed relationship between our explicative variable and the cross-correlation of
outputs. Second, we need to check whether the causality goes in the right direction.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, other variables (observable or unobservable) could be responsible
for the negative relationship between the business cycle synchronization and diﬀerences in labor
market institutions. This leads us to include a set of observable control variables Xi,j,t that
are likely to inﬂuence GDP comovement. Moreover, we cannot exclude the role of omitted
variables that would jointly explain evolution in LMI and BC comovement. Such variables
are typically factors speciﬁc to the couple of countries i and j that do not vary over time.
For instance, historical links between countries i and j, cultural proximity (such as common
language), geographical proximity are likely to favor both convergence in LMI and business
cycle synchronization. These elements are captured by the inclusion of a country-pair ﬁxed
eﬀect in the regressions. It is consequently redundant to include time-invariant country-pair
speciﬁc variables, typically gravity variables (such as distance, dummies indicating a common
border, common language, colonial linkages, etc.). While gravity variables are commonly found
to inﬂuence trade in the related empirical literature (Baxter and Kouparitsas (2006)), we capture
their inﬂuence on BC synchronization by the ﬁxed eﬀect. Besides, dummies for each decade are
included, to control for the intertemporal variability that is common to all country pairs in the
sample. Consequently, the residual term ωijt of equation (11) is speciﬁed as follows:
ωijt = µij + λt + εijt (12)
µij is a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect, i.e. it is invariant across time and speciﬁc for each country pair
{i,j}. λt stands for time-eﬀect speciﬁc variables, and εijt is the “usual” residual with standard
13properties (mean equal to 0, homoskedastic, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with: the
ﬁxed eﬀects µij, λ and any control variable). However, explanatory variables are allowed to be
correlated with individual eﬀects µij. Our choice of a ﬁxed eﬀect (versus a random eﬀect model)
is conﬁrmed by a Hausman test.
The second problem related to endogeneity is reversed causality. It could indeed be argued
that it is a closer synchronization in business cycles that is responsible for convergence in LMI. In
our view, it is not likely to be the case that medium-run variables such as output cross-correlation
aﬀect the evolution of structural variables like LMI. Nevertheless, from an econometric point of
view, the possibility of reverse causality should be controlled for. As a result, our measure of
divergence in LMI for each country pair {i,j} is based on the situation of both countries at the
beginning of each decade, while the cross-country correlation in output is based on the mean of
quarterly observations on the whole decade. Although it is not strictly speaking an instrumental
variables method, it does control for reverse causality since diﬀerences in labor market protection
at the beginning of the decade (1963, 1973, 1983, 1993) could hardly be explained by the joint
behavior of output over the whole following decade. Our set of control variables Xi,j,t refer to
variables as observed at the beginning of decade t as well. As argued by Baxter and Kouparitsas
(2005), we relate our explanatory variables to the business cycle correlation over the subsequent
sub-sample, so that the direction of causality is clear.
4.2 Control variables
If willing to put into evidence the impact of diﬀerence in LMI on business-cycle comovement in
a convincing way, we have to show that it is robust to the inclusion of other variables that have
been shown to be important determinants in that respect. Regressions will therefore include the
following set of control variables.
Factor endowments We consider two factors of production, the stock of physical capital
per worker (K) and of arable land per worker (L). Trade theory predicts a close relationship
between factor endowments, trade and international business cycles. Speciﬁcally, the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory predicts that country pairs should trade more, the more diﬀerent are their factor
endowments. The higher the minium factor endowments between the two countries, the stronger
the comovement. The minimum factor endowment between the two countries must then display a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Conversely, the maximum must have a negative and signiﬁcant
estimated coeﬃcient. In order to compare our results to Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005)’s, we
consider bilateral indicators of factor endowments that capture the maximum value of the variable
between the two countries. We thus expect a negative coeﬃcient associated with these variables.
Trade and trade agreements We consider diﬀerent measures of trade intensity.
14• Bilateral trade intensity: The relation between business cycles and trade has been exten-
sively debated, both theoretically and empirically. In the classical Ricardian theory as well
as in New Trade theory (Helpman and Krugman (1985)), trade leads to an increase in
sectorial specialization. If the source of shocks is sectorial, then trade should reduce the
cross-country GDP correlation. Yet, it can also play a role as a transmission channel of
exogenous changes that are common to the countries. Trade intensity should then lead
to increased BC comovement. Empirically, most studies conclude that trade intensity is
strongly and positively linked to BC synchronization (Frankel and Rose (1998), Canova
and Dellas (1993), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) among others). We deﬁne a measure of
bilateral trade intensity as the sum of bilateral exports and imports divided by total trade
in countries i and j. It is denoted “bilateral trade” in the regression results tables. More
intensive bilateral trade is expected to enhance cross-country comovement.
• Total trade intensity: This variable is meant to capture the degree of openness of both
countries, independently of the extent of bilateral trade between them. According to Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2005), this variable may capture the ﬂow of technological transmission
that occurs through trade in general, not with a speciﬁc trading partner. Besides, it may
be a good measure of the extent to which a country is exposed to global shocks. We
thus expect that higher trade, in aggregate, leads to more correlated business cycles. As in
Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), the extent of total trade carried out by the pair of countries
is computed as
TT =
xi + mi + xj + mj
yi + yj
(13)
where xi and mi denote country i’s total exports and imports measured at the beginning
of each decade, and yi denotes country i’s total GDP. We expect a positive sign associated
with this variable (denoted “total trade”in the tables).
• Trade agreements: The existence of trade agreements is meant to increase the extent of
trade among countries, as empirically shown by Frankel and Rose (1998) (among others).
It is likely to enhance GDP cross-correlation as well. We build a dummy variable “Dum
EU” to capture membership to the European Union, and we expect a positive sign.
Similarity in economic structure If the primary source of perturbations is sector-speciﬁc,
then countries with greater similarity in economic structure should be more correlated, every
thing else equal. Empirical literature gives some support to that assumption. According to Stock-
man (1988), sectorial changes are an important source of output ﬂuctuations. Imbs (2001a), Imbs
(2001b) obtain that similarity in industrial structure is positively and signiﬁcantly related to BC
comovement. We study the direct eﬀect of economic similarity on business cycles synchronization
through several variables.
15• Industrial similarity: As in Imbs (2001a), we use three-digit sectorial data (30 manu-
facturing sectors), to construct an index of manufacturing industry similarity for our 20
countries. Following Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), we gauge the degree of international









with sik the fraction of manufacturing devoted to sector k in country i, measured in terms
of value-added as in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). By construction, ISC takes values
between 0 and 1. Similar economic countries are characterized by ISC = 1, while divergent
specialization yields a low value of ISC. We expect a positive coeﬃcient associated with
industry similarity.
• Similarity in the share of services: Messina (2005) documents remarkable diﬀerences in
the relative sizes of the service employment share across countries with similar income per
capita. In addition, the weight of the service sector in OECD countries has gone through
considerable changes in the last decades. The average service employment share has in-
creased from 45.8% at the beginning of the 1960s to 66.3% in the early 1990s. By focusing
on industrial structure only, one can miss part of the picture when gauging similarity in eco-
nomic structure. We consequently examine the impact of divergence in service employment
share, whose measure is built as follows:
Diff. in serv. sharei,j,t = |Servicei,t − Servicej,t|
where Servicei,t denotes country i service employment share at the beginning of decade
t. In that case, we expect a negative sign associated with this variable (denoted “Diﬀ. in
serv. share”) in the regressions.
• Similarity in baskets of traded goods: Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) underline that, if
countries export and/or import similar baskets of goods, then they would be aﬀected
similarly by changes to the world prices of their import and export goods. In addition,
countries with similar baskets of traded goods would be aﬀected similarly in the event of
sector-speciﬁc changes hitting their export and/or import sectors. Following Baxter and









As si,k denotes the sector k’s share of country i’s total imports, TSC identiﬁes similarity
in imports.7 We expect a positive sign of the coeﬃcient associated with in the regressions.
7Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) propose alternative measures of trade similarity, that are based on exports
16Economic policy variables Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005) underline the role of ﬁscal
convergence in BC comovement. We extend their analysis by investigating the role of the simi-
larity in monetary policy as well. As a result, cross-country heterogeneity in ﬁscal and monetary
policies is captured as follows:
• Our measure of ﬁscal divergence is the cross-country diﬀerence in the general government
budget surplus (+) or deﬁcit (-), measured as a percentage of national GDP. The measured
is averaged over 10 years of annual data for each decade and denoted “Diﬀ. in budget” in
the regression results tables.
• Disparity in monetary policy is measured as the average absolute value of short run interest
rate diﬀerential (denoted “Diﬀ. in int. rate” in the following tables). Convergence in mon-
etary policy may also capture the monetary discipline associated with a pegged exchange
rate.
As underlined by Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005), the expected sign for both measures
is ambiguous. In the presence of country-speciﬁc shocks, accommodating policies could actually
result in having simultaneously cross-country divergence in economic policies and more synchro-
nized cycles. In that case, the coeﬃcient of our measure of economic policy similarity is expected
to be positively signed. On the opposite, economic policy may constitute per se a source of
asymmetrical shock across countries. In that case, divergence in economic policy reduces BC
synchronization. Darvas, Rose and Szarpary’s (2005) empirical results support this last case as
they obtain a negative coeﬃcient associated to ﬁscal divergence.
Restrictions to international capital ﬂows We refer to Quinn’s (1997) index of capital
mobility, that takes values between 0 and 100, increasing in the degree of ﬁnancial openness.
We capture similarity in capital openness between countries i and j by considering the absolute
diﬀerence in capital mobility index:
Diff. in Quinn0s indexi,j,t = |Capitali,t − Capitalj,t| (14)
where Capitali,t refer to the Quinn (1997) index in country i. Imbs (2004) ﬁnd evidence that
ﬁnancially integrated regions are signiﬁcantly more synchronized. We then expect a negative
sign associated with this variable (denoted “Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index” in the tables).
or on bilateral trade ﬂows. We thus build these variables and investigate their role on BC comovement as
well. Preliminary experiments led us to retain similarity in imports, as it yields the most signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Descriptive statistic analysis goes in the same direction. Countries in our sample are characterized by low similarity
on exports and total trade. The associated mean values amount to 0.28 and 0.21 respectively, over the 4 decades.
In comparison, the mean value of import similarity is 0.65. OECD countries are thus more similar with respect
to their imports than with respect to their exports. There is thus little surprise that it is import similarity that
matters most in business cycle comovement.
17The summary of the distribution of our control variables and their correlation with ρy are
displayed in Appendix C. Tables C2 and C3 display correlations across variables, with signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcients in bold and associated p-value in parenthesis. Several variables seem relevant in
accounting for business cycle synchronization: bilateral trade, endowment in capital, ﬁscal con-
vergence, import similarity and membership to the European Union. All signiﬁcant correlation
coeﬃcients have the expected sign.
4.3 Diﬀerences in labor market institutions and business cycle comovement
Tables 5 and 6 display the results of various regressions for testing the impact of all labor market
variables, when including control variables Xi,j,t.
Column I in Table 5 presents regression results when only diﬀerences in LMI are included
as explanatory variables in the regression. Only diﬀerences in tax wedges appear signiﬁcant and
correctly signed, as divergence in tax wedges lower bilateral activity comovement. The remainder
of Tables 5 and 6 indicates that this result is robust to the introduction of alternative control
variables. Columns II through XI report regression results with the inclusion of control variables:
endowment factors (II), bilateral trade (III), total trade (IV), dummy capturing membership to
the European Union (V), industrial similarity (VI), similarity in manufacturing sector (VII),
convergence in ﬁscal policy (VIII), convergence in monetary policy (IX), diﬀerence in service
share employment (X) and in capital ﬂow regulation (XI). In column XII (Table 6), we report
regression results when all control variables are included (our “Benchmark regression” hereafter).8
Estimation results reported in Tables 5 and 6 show that countries with similar tax wedges tend
to exhibit more synchronized cycles.
LMI We can hardly compare our results with the related literature for want of papers linking
LMI to GDP comovement. Nevertheless, we can refer to results obtained in the labor market lit-
erature that focuses on the determinants of equilibrium unemployment level in OECD countries.
First, it is worth mentioning that the empirical literature does not reach clear-cut conclusions
on the key dimensions in LMI that aﬀect employment performances (Layard and Nickell (1999),
Pissarides (1998)). Yet, in both empirical and theoretical ﬁelds there is some consensus that the
role of employment protection laws on the employment level is ambiguous. Empirical papers
by Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) and Scarpetta (1996) (among others) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of employment protection laws on the unemployment level. Our result that divergence in
employment protection laws does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect BC comovement is consistent with these
conclusions.
8We control for multicollinearity, measured through a condition number, the ratio of the largest to the smallest
characteristic roots of the moment matrix. Common practice suggests that multicollinearity becomes a potentially
serious problem when the moment condition is in excess of 20. We check that regressions meet this requirement.
Multicollinearity check drives us to exclude industry similarity (ISC) and openness (Total trade). In simple
regressions, these variables have not been found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect international business cycles.
18Second, regressions displayed in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that divergence in tax wedge across
countries is the main channel through which LMI aﬀect GDP comovement. This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with preliminary descriptive statistics results (see Table 4). In addition, it is in line with
empirical results obtained in the labor market literature. Most papers get a signiﬁcant (positive)
impact of tax wedge on unemployment in various OECD countries (Nickell (1998), Daveri and
Tabellini (2000) (among others)).9 The eﬀect may be rationalized by our WS-PS framework.
Analysis driven in Section 2 shows that heavy tax rate limits the magnitude of employment
response to aggregate shocks. Cross-country diﬀerences in tax rates imply asymmetric responses
of employment and output, thereby reducing the international GDP correlation.
According to column I (Table 5), a reduction in tax wedge divergence of 10 percentage points
– equal to one standard deviation in tax wedge divergence – around its mean tends to raise the
correlation of business cycles between a pair of countries ceteris paribus, by around 0.08. With an
average GDP correlation of 0.198, this is a non-negligible eﬀect. The eﬀect remains signiﬁcant
when controlling for a larger set of determinants of business-cycle comovement (Column XII,
Table 6). In that case, ceteris paribus a reduction in tax wedge divergence of 10 percentage
points around its mean tends to raise the GDP cross-country correlation by around 0.07. This
is a sizeable eﬀect. To compare with, a one standard-deviation reduction in ﬁscal divergence
(“Diﬀ.in budget”) increases GDP comovement around 0.055.
Control variables Regarding the estimated eﬀects of our set of control variables on GDP
comovement, we get results consistent with the literature, as all signiﬁcant control variables
appear correctly signed.
Factor endowments yield a negative sign when they are the only control variables included
(column II, Table 5). This is also the case in the benchmark regression (column XII, Table
6). This result is consistent with Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) who underline the major role
of factor endowments in accounting for bilateral synchronization. Precisely, as in Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2006), we ﬁnd that it is the diﬀerence in land that matters most.
Unlike Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant role of similarity in
capital restrictions (columns X and XII, Table 6). This may be due to a selection bias in the
country sample. While they explore business cycle comovement among developed and developing
economies, our study focuses on OECD countries, which are already open to capital ﬂows. Given
our countries sample, it is not so surprising that the impact of ﬁnancial openness on bilateral
output synchronization is estimated weak.
The result that ﬁscal convergence favors international comovement is consistent with Darvas,
Rose, and Szarpary (2005) (column XII, Table 6). Our point estimate for ﬁscal convergence
(-0.019) also matches their own results (when they include country ﬁxed eﬀects). In addition, we
9Even if some studies indicate that employment taxes have no long run impact on unemployment (Baccaro
and Rei (2005), OECD (1990), Appendix 6).
19ﬁnd that similarity in monetary policy signiﬁcantly matters as well (columns IX and XII, Table
6). Our paper strengthens Darvas, Rose and Szarpary’s (2005) ﬁndings, as we control for many
more possible inﬂuences on our dependant variable. Besides, we show that ﬁscal convergence
remains signiﬁcant in spite of the inclusion of monetary policy variable. Disparity in ﬁscal and
monetary policies lowers international comovement.
The related empirical literature does not reach some clear-cut consensus regards the role of
bilateral trade and industrial similarity. Imbs (2001a) highlights the role of industrial similarity
(ISC) as a major factor in BC synchronization, while Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) insist
on the key role of bilateral trade, as Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005).10 In our benchmark
regression, none of these variables is found to be signiﬁcant. The role of similarity in service
share is not robust either to the inclusion of a larger set of control variables. Several elements
might account for our results.
• First, the weak inﬂuence of bilateral trade may be due to the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, given
the inclusion of decade dummies and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Section 4.4 investigates that
point.
• Secondly, we ﬁnd that similarity in the baskets of imported goods (TSC) is signiﬁcantly
and positively correlated with GDP comovement. In our view, our results somehow recon-
cile Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Imbs (2001a) on the respective roles of trade and
economic similarity. Given the increase in intra-ﬁrm trade over the last decades (Antras
(2006)), similarity in imports may capture the role of trade in BC comovement. Besides, the
role of similarity in the import basket in BC comovement may be suggestive of the impor-
tance of sectorial shocks. With convergent sectorial structures, similarity in the structure
of manufactured good consumption is likely to enhance GDP comovement.
4.4 Robustness analysis
We explore the robustness of our ﬁndings to the role of time and country-pair dummies. The
estimated eﬀects of cross-country diﬀerences in tax wedges on GDP comovement are robust to
these changes, as shown in Table 7. It reports regression results when we exclude decade dummies
(column II), country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects (columns III and IV), and both (column V). For sake of
comparison, column (I) recalls our benchmark regression (Table 6, column XII).
Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), Frankel and Rose (1998) (among others) stress the role
of bilateral trade intensity in enhancing BC comovement. In contrast, our benchmark results
suggest that bilateral trade is not a signiﬁcant determinant of BC synchronization (Table 6,
column XII). One potential explanation may be linked to the inclusion of time and country pair
ﬁxed eﬀects. Time dummies are likely to capture the gradual liberalization in trade since the
10Yet, Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005) do not investigate the role of economic similarity.
20early 1960s. Besides, the country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects capture gravity variables, which are commonly
found to drive bilateral trade. In that respect, changes in the model’s speciﬁcation may aﬀect our
benchmark result. Yet, results reported in Table 7 conﬁrm that bilateral trade is not a driving
force behind GDP synchronization. Except when neither decade dummies nor country-pair ﬁxed
eﬀects are included (Column V), the variable of bilateral trade appears insigniﬁcant.
Interestingly, we get that cross-country diﬀerences in the degree of coordination in wage bar-
gaining signiﬁcantly reduce BC synchronization when country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects are suppressed:
In columns III to V, the coeﬃcient associated with “Diﬀ. in co” is signiﬁcantly negative. This sug-
gests that the wage-negotiating process constitutes another channel through which heterogeneity
in LMI aﬀect BC comovement. As shown by descriptive statistics, the degree of coordination
displays low degree of variability, and its eﬀect is not robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects.
As a whole, Table 7 conﬁrms the robustness of our results. The signiﬁcant determinants
of BC comovement that we previously identiﬁed remain. In most cases, coeﬃcients associated
with cross-country diﬀerences in labor taxation systems, in factor-endowments (MAXL), in
governmental policies (“Diﬀ. in budget” notably) and in import similarity (TSC) remain of the
same sign and signiﬁcant.
5 Exploring the role of interactions across LMI variables
Labor market studies point out that institutions interact with each other in the determination of
unemployment dynamics (Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Belot and Van Ours (2004)). Our theo-
retical analysis (Section 2) indicates that interactions between LMI also aﬀect GDP international
comovement. This section investigates that point empirically.
Before commenting the estimation results, we present the interaction variables. We are
primarily interested in measuring how the eﬀect of tax wedge diﬀerential on BC comovement is
aﬀected by the degree of cross-country similarity regards other LMI. We thus include dummy
variables that identify a similar labor market functioning in the two countries of a given pair.
Precisely, we choose to identify the eﬀect of a “rigid” labour market in both countries, rather
than the one of “ﬂexible” labor market regulations in the country pair. The theoretical model
indeed implies that the eﬀect of tax wedge diﬀerence on GDP comovement can be dampened in
case of generous unemployment beneﬁts (b), low trade union coordination (n) and high trade
union bargaining power (β). The eﬀects are less clear-cut with regards to ﬁring costs (f). In
this analysis, we want to identify potential labor market situations where our tax wedge eﬀect
might be moderated by the other LMI.
In a ﬁrst step, we build a dummy variable that identiﬁes rigidity of the labor market in
each dimension of the labour market institutions. The dummy variable is country-speciﬁc and
decade-speciﬁc. For instance, one country (in a particular LMI dimension) can be identiﬁed as
“non rigid” in the ﬁrst decade and “rigid” in the subsequent periods. Except for the degree of
21coordination of wage bargaining, we identify a country as “rigid” if its LMI value is superior to
the threshold value of 1.6 times the median value obtained over the whole country sample.11
We proceed the other way round regards the degree of coordination, as our theoretical results
indicate that a low degree of coordination (i.e., n large) is likely to dampen the impact of tax
wedge diﬀerence on GDP comovement. In that case, the dummy identiﬁes countries with a
coordination degree inferior to the threshold value of 0.4 times the median value obtained on the
whole country sample.
In a second step, we build a dummy indicating if the two countries of a given country pair
are “rigid” in each LMI dimension. For instance, the dummy “Both epl rigid” equals 1 if both
countries have stringent employment laws, and 0 otherwise (if one or the two countries are below
the threshold value).
This allows us to investigate the potential role on BC comovement, of 1) being similar and
rigid along each LMI dimension per se, and 2) in interaction with divergence in tax wedge. In
the ﬁrst case, we focus on the estimated coeﬃcient of the dummy, say “Both epl rigid”. In the
second case, we focus on the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction variable. For instance,
the variable denoted “Diﬀ in tw* Both epl rigid” measures the marginal impact of diﬀerences in
tax wedge on GDP correlation, conditional on the fact that the country pair {i,j} has strong
employment protection laws.
We ﬁrst investigate the role of each dimension of LMI in interaction with tax wedge dif-
ferences, before deriving the results when all interaction eﬀects are included in the regression.
Results are displayed in Table 8. In column I, we include the dummy “Both epl rigid”, per se
and in interaction with tax wedge diﬀerences (“Diﬀ in tw* Both epl rigid”). We then repeat the
analysis on the degree of coordination (column II), union density (III) and generosity of unem-
ployment beneﬁts (IV). In column V, all interacting LMI variables are included in the regression.
In that case also, the dummy “Both tw high” identiﬁes if the two countries within a pair have
heavy tax rates. In each case, we include control variables that have been shown to be robust
determinants of BC comovement.
Two results emerge. First, the signiﬁcant determinants of BC synchronization that we pre-
viously identiﬁed remain. Diﬀerences in tax wedge, in ﬁscal and monetary policy, in factor
endowment, as well as similarity in imports signiﬁcantly account for BC comovement. Secondly,
interactions between LMI are found to aﬀect GDP correlation, along two dimensions: union
density (udnet) and employment protection (epl).
Let us ﬁrst consider the role of union density. As shown in column III (conﬁrmed in column
V), the fact that both countries have a strong union density reduces the eﬀect of divergence in
tax wedge on GDP comovement, as the coeﬃcient associated with “Diﬀ in tw* Both udnet high”
is signiﬁcantly positive. This result is consistent with our theoretical model. Indeed, the higher
11This threshold value results from an arbitrage between i) identifying countries with the more stringent LMI,
and ii) having enough point estimates for the dummy.
22the union density (β in the model), the higher the workers’ bargaining power. Every thing else
equal, this pushes the negotiated wage up and reduces the labor demand, hence its sensibility
to other labor market institutions. Our estimated coeﬃcient on “Diﬀ in tw* Both udnet high” is
consistent with this theoretical mechanism. The eﬀect of an international harmonization of tax
wedge on GDP synchronization is moderated by the presence of strong unions in both countries.
As for employment protection laws, the theoretical model states that employment protec-
tion regulations (i.e. ﬁring costs f) have an ambiguous eﬀect on the employment level. As a
form of substitute for wage compensation in the bargaining process, high ﬁring costs lower the
equilibrium wage, which increases labor demand and its sensitivity to other LMI (WS eﬀect). In
contrast, ﬁring costs as an element of labor cost, lower employment (PS eﬀect). Belot and Van
Ours’s (2004) empirical results on OECD countries suggest that employment protection aﬀects
unemployment dynamics through the WS eﬀect: higher ﬁring costs increase employment and its
responses to other LMI. Our estimates are consistent with these ﬁndings when we consider GDP
cross country correlations (Table 8, columns I and V). The fact that both countries have strong
employment protection laws signiﬁcantly enhances BC comovement (the coeﬃcient associated
with “Both epl rigid” is signiﬁcantly positive) and magniﬁes the negative impact of tax-wedge
diﬀerences on cross-country GDP correlation (the coeﬃcient associated with “Diﬀ in tw* Both
epl rigid” is signiﬁcantly negative). The impact of tax wedge diﬀerence on GDP comovement is
larger when both countries are characterized by stringent employment protection laws, which is
consistent with the WS eﬀect of ﬁring costs in our model.
There is some broad consensus in the labor market literature, that complementarities between
LMI matter in the labor market performance. Our estimates extend this result in the ﬁeld of
international business cycles. Table 8 suggests that employment protection laws and trade unions’
power interact with labor ﬁscal policy, in aﬀecting cross-country GDP comovement. Moreover,
the direction of the interacting eﬀect is non-trivial, as the interacting variable may enhance
or dampen the single eﬀect of tax wedge divergence on BC synchronization. The underlying
complexity between the various dimensions of the labor market regulations and their role on BC
comovement, is rationalized by our open-economy WS-PS model.
6 Conclusion
The originality of the paper lies in assessing the impact of LMI on business cycle synchroniza-
tion using panel techniques, thereby exploiting the time dimension as well as the cross section
dimension of the variance in the data. The driving forces behind cross country output correla-
tions have been extensively documented. Yet, little is known about the impact of institutions on
international comovement. This paper aims at ﬁlling this gap, focusing on labour market insti-
tutions (LMI). Furthermore, our estimation strategy controls for a large set of possible factors
inﬂuencing GDP correlations, which allows to confront the results with those found in previous
23studies.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. (i) Cross-country heterogeneity in LMI mat-
ter. In particular, disparity in tax wedges yields lower GDP comovement. Sensitivity analysis
conﬁrms that this result is robust. (ii) Interactions between LMI matter as well. In particular,
the eﬀect of tax wedge diﬀerence on GDP comovement is aﬀected by similarity in employment
protection and trade unions’s bargaining power. (iii) Darvas, Rose, and Szarpary (2005)’s ﬁnd-
ings on ﬁscal convergence are found to be robust to the inclusion of a larger set of control
variables. Furthermore, we provide new evidence that convergence in monetary policy matters
as well. (iv) As in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), similarity in industrial structure does not
appear signiﬁcant. In addition, trade matters. However, the relevant trade measure in accounting
for OECD GDP comovement is import similarity. This robust result indicates that similar terms
of trade changes enhance cross country output correlations.
In this paper, we establish that labour market institutions aﬀect international output ﬂuctu-
ations in OECD countries. This result suggests that the impact of LMI in international business
cycle shall be investigated in international dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Cam-
polmi and Faia (2006) and Holt (2004) provide interesting contributions on this issue. However,
they discard disparity in labor taxation that is found to matter in accounting for GDP comove-
ment. This is left for future research.
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27Appendix
A Countries
20 OECD countries are included in the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.
B Data sources
The database was made from several sources.
• Cross country correlations for quarterly GDP and unemployment are based on OECD
BSDB (1964:1-1999:4). Bilateral correlations are computed over 4 decades : 1964:1-1973:4
(decade 1), 1974:1-1983:4 (decade 2), 1984:1-1993:4 (decade3) and 1994:1-1999:4 (decade
4).
The set of explanatory variables spans a wide array of possible factors inﬂuencing cross
country correlations. For all variables, observations at the beginning of each decade are included
in the database. For instance, employment protection laws for decade 1 corresponds to the value
observed in 1964, 1974 in decade 2, 1984 in decade 3 and 1994 in decade 4. We want to identify
the impact of each variable on cross country correlations over the subsequent decade, thereby
making the direction of causality clearer.
• LMI come from Nickell and Nunziata (2001), except gross beneﬁt replacement rate that




Employment Protection Index range in 1-2. It consists of the laws, Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
Laws (epl) regulations and administrative decisions that
constraint the contractual conditions under which
a worker can be dismissed; the laws and regulations
relating to the compensation an employer
is obliged to pay when regulations determining
remedies for wrongful or unfair dismissal.
Net Union Density The percentage of employees who are union Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
(udnet) members. This variable is intended to capture
union bargaining power.
Bargaining Index with range 1 through 3. This index is Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
coordination (co) increasing in the degree of coordination in the
bargaining process on the employer’s as
well as on the union’s side.
Gross beneﬁt Percentage of working wage OECD (2004)
replacement rate (brr)
Tax wedge (tw) Percent. This variable is equal to the sum of Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
the employer’s tax rate (employer’s social
security contributions as % of wages
and salaries), the direct tax rate (amount of
direct taxes as % of households’ current receipts
and the indirect tax rate (total indirect tax of
as % private ﬁnal expenditures
• Factor endowments:
– average years of schooling for total population (Source: Barro and Lee (2001))
– capital per worker using aggregate investment (Source: Easterly and Levine (2001))
– Land comes from FAO United Nations statistics (available at http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/)
– Population from Penn World (Tables 61).
• Measures of trade intensity
The computation of bilateral trade intensity (“BT”) is taken from Darvas, Rose, and
Szarpary (2005). Our measure of total trade intensity follows Baxter and Kouparitsas
(2005). Data are taken from the NBER UN Trade Data base, available on the NBER
website (Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)).
• Similarity in economic structure are computed from three sources.
– Three-digit sectorial data are from United Nations Industrial Development Organi-
zation (UNIDO), and were used to construct an index of manufacturing industry
similarity (“ISC”) for our set of 20 countries in 1964, 1974, 1984 and 1994.
– As UNIDO data covers only manufacturing sectors, we want to supplement our mea-
sure of specialization with the service employment shares provided by Messina (2005).
29– Regards similarity in trade, we retain the same indicator as in Baxter and Kouparitsas
(2005). Data are taken from the NBER UN Trade Data base, reachable through the
NBER website (Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)).
• Capital restrictions are based on Quinn (1997)’s updated database that is constructed
from narrative descriptions in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) regarding capital descriptions. This IMF annual report
summarizes the laws governments use to govern international ﬁnancial transactions. Quinn
(1997) attempts to capture the intensity of enforcement of controls on both the capital ac-
count and the current account through a careful reading of the narrative descriptions in the
AREAER. He scores the intensity of controls for capital account receipts and capital ac-
count payments separately. For each of these two categories, a score of 0 indicates payments
are forbidden, 0.5 indicates that there are quantitative or other regulatory restrictions, 1
indicates that transactions are subject to heavy taxes, 1.5 indicates that there are less
severe taxes, and 2 indicates that transactions are free of restrictions or taxes. The sum
of the values for the two categories is an indicator of overall capital account openness that
ranges between 0 and 4, with 4 representing a fully open economy. The updated dataset
we consider is used in Inclan, Quinn, and Toyoda (2001) and transform each measure into
a 0 to 100 scale.
• Several variables are from Andrew Rose’s webpage: currency union and regional agreement,
Volume of bilateral trade.
C Descriptive statistics
Table C1 presents descriptive statistics related to the distribution of our set of variables. Tables
C2 and C3 display the correlation coeﬃcient between our set of other control variables and cross-
country GDP correlation ρy. The ﬁgure in parenthesis below each correlation is its signiﬁcance
level.
30TABLE C1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ρy 760 0.1981433 0.3526946 -0.87744 0.9440
Diﬀ. in epl 760 0.6762 0.4710 0 2
Diﬀ. in tw 741 0.1520 0.1073 0.00133 0.5512
Diﬀ. in co 741 0.7145 0.5156 0 2
Diﬀ. in udnet 741 0.2092 0.1572 0.001 0.8091
Diﬀ. in brr 760 0.1450 0.1107 0 0.5472
Total trade 760 0.4361 0.2388 0.0858 1.3194
Bilateral trade 760 1.7965 2.7474 0.0314 26.060
Dum EU 760 0.2118 0.4088 0 1
MAXL 760 −5.485 2.504 −9.774 −1.468
MAXK 760 1.920 0.9612 -2.206 3.046
ISC 722 0.844 0.0860 0.4972 0.990
TSC 760 0.6415 0.1742 0.17435 0.979
Diﬀ. in serv. share 741 7.848 5.844 0.0168 31.838
Diﬀ. in budget 760 3.585 2.407 0.4148 14.476
Diﬀ. in int. rate 648 3.136 2.175 0.0581 12.649
Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index 760 20.082 17.285 0 87.5
TABLE C2 ρy TT BT Dum EU MAXL MAXK
Total trade 0.0295 1.0000
(0.4169)
Bilateral trade 0.1763 -0.0963 1.0000
(0.00) (0.0079)
Dum EU 0.1630 0.2733 0.2497 1.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MAXL -0.0330 0.3934 -0.0320 -0.1071 1.0000
(0.3630) ( 0.00) (0.3780) (0.0031)
MAXK -0.1338 0.3560 -0.3700 -0.0843 0.3542 1.0000
( 0.0002) (0.00) (0.0000) ( 0.0201) ( 0.00)
ISC 0.0829 -0.3063 0.3126 -0.0351 0.0051 -0.3406
( 0.0259) (0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.3465 ) (0.8918) ( 0.00)
TSC 0.2445 0.0899 0.1147 0.2340 -0.0715 -0.2339
(0.00) (0.0132) (0.0015) (0.00) (0.0487) (0.0000)
Diﬀ. in serv. share -0.0258 -0.1174 -0.1512 -0.0447 -0.0702 -0.2121
( 0.4830) (0.0014) ( 0.0000) ( 0.2243) ( 0.0563) ( 0.00)
Diﬀ. in budget -0.0836 0.1229 -0.1177 0.0005 0.0784 0.2395
( 0.0212) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.9885) (0.0307) ( 0.00)
Diﬀ. in int. rate -0.0033 -0.1716 -0.1684 -0.2223 -0.0047 0.0334
( 0.9339) (0.00) ( 0.00) (0.00) (0.9045) (0.3963)
Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index -0.0036 -0.2379 -0.0562 -0.1693 -0.0290 -0.1704
(0.9217) (0.00) (0.1213) (0.00) (0.4254) (0.00)
31TABLE C3 ISC TSC Diﬀ. in Diﬀ. in Diﬀ. in
serv. share budget int. rate
TSC 0.0904 1.0000
( 0.0151)
Diﬀ. in serv. share -0.1735 0.0358 1.0000
(0.00) (0.3303)
Diﬀ. in budget -0.1859 0.1097 0.0463 1.0000
( 0.00) ( 0.0025) (0.2080)
Diﬀ. in int. rate -0.1417 0.0478 0.2357 0.2356 1.0000
( 0.0004) ( 0.2242) (0.00) ( 0.00)
Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index -0.0126 0.0259 0.2076 -0.0876 0.2457
(0.7361 (0.4754) (0.00) (0.0157 ) ( 0.00)
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Table 1: Calibration
α β b n η q f τ1 τ2
0.64 0.5 0.40 1 6 0.1 0.4 0.33 0.57
Table 2: LMI variables: some descriptive statistics over the period 1965-1995
LMI distribution, across countries
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max
Empl. protection (epl) 1.041 0.563 0.1 1.96
Tax wedge (tw) 0.452 0.114 0.285 0.655
Bargaining coord. (co) 2.064 0.594 1 3
Union density (udnet) 0.420 0.166 0.111 0.754
Beneﬁt repl. ratio (brr) 0.385 0.137 0.096 0.630
LMI distribution, across time
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max
Empl. protection 1.207 0.140 0.779 1.158
Tax wedge 0.460 0.052 0.3662 0.533
Bargaining coord. 2.068 0.013 2.036 2.082
Union density 0.418 0.026 0.386 0.460
Beneﬁt repl. ratio 0.381 0.085 0.240 0.479
Note: Time distribution has been calculated on a per-year basis.
Table 3: Cross-country GDP correlation, by country group
I II III IV
All countries Flexible LMI Rigid LMI Flex - Rigid LMI
ρy 0.1981 0.2326 0.2113 0.1476
33Table 4: Correlation between LMI similarity and BC comovement
Diﬀ. in epl Diﬀ. in udnet Diﬀ. in co Diﬀ. in brr Diﬀ. in tw
ρy −0.0799∗ 0.0145 −0.1330∗ 0.0225 −0.0956∗
Notes: Spearman correlations on 20 country observations.
Notes: ∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 5: Regression results (1)
Dependent variable: cross-country GDP correlation
I II III IV V VI
Diﬀ. in epl -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.012
(0.663) (0.641) (0.653) (0.647) (0.649) (0.817)
Diﬀ. in tw −0.430∗∗ −0.426∗∗ −0.437∗∗ −0.413∗ −0.488∗∗ −0.459∗∗
(0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.058) (0.030) (0.037)
Diﬀ. in co 0.058 0.04 0.058 0.056 0.055 0.061
(0.339) (0.516) (0.336) (0.356) (0.367) (0.321)
Diﬀ. in udnet -0.058 -0.048 -0.063 -0.057 -0.041 -0.004
(0.730) (0.777) (0.712) (0.735) (0.811) (0.983)
Diﬀ. in brr -0.047 -0.039 -0.048 -0.028 -0.052 0.041













Cst 0.240∗∗∗ −1.595∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.166 0.269∗∗∗ -0.278
(0.004) (0.051) (0.020) (0.368) (0.003) (0.315)
Obs. 723 723 723 723 723 687
R2 0.035 0.045 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.044
σ
2(b Y )
σ2(Y ) 0.338 0.345 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.361
p-values in parenthesis
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies included but not reported
34Table 6: Regression results (2)
Dependent variable: cross-country GDP correlation
Model VII VIII IX X XI XII
Diﬀ. in epl -0.005 -0.026 -0.09 -0.05 -0.021 -0.094
(-0.923) (0.610) (0.173) (0.336) (0.671) (0.170)
Diﬀ. in tw −0.526∗∗ −0.414∗ -0.311 −0.380∗ −0.449∗∗ −0.478∗
(-0.013) (0.053) (0.197) (0.082) (0.038) (0.058)
Diﬀ. in co 0.055 0.056 0.092 0.07 0.057 0.06
(-0.361) (0.356) (0.157) (0.250) (0.345) (0.352)
Diﬀ. in udnet -0.077 -0.051 0.014 0.071 -0.049 0.159
(-0.645) (0.760) (0.943) (0.682) (0.769) (0.422)
Diﬀ. in brr -0.027 -0.015 0.037 -0.1 -0.052 0.036
(0.881) (0.933) (0.859) (0.592) (0.776) (0.861)
Diﬀ. in budget -0.012 −0.019∗∗
(0.154) (0.036)
Diﬀ. in int. rate −0.022∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.061) (0.039)
Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index 0.001 0.001
(0.463) (0.256)












Cst -0.042 0.276∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ −2.396∗∗
(0.699) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011)
Obs. 723 723 647 706 723 635
R2 0.062 0.038 0.045 0.041 0.036 0.112
σ
2(b Y )
σ2(Y ) 0.356 0.340 0.372 0.348 0.338 0.424
p-values in parenthesis
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies included but not reported
35Table 7: Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable: cross-country GDP correlation
Model I II III IV V
BR No TE No FE No FE, cluster No TE & FE
Diﬀ. in epl -0.094 -0.059 -0.028 -0.028 -0.016
(0.170) (0.386) (0.402) (0.351) (0.592)
Diﬀ. in tw −0.478∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.233∗ −0.233∗ −0.267∗∗
(0.058) (0.007) (0.083) (0.074) (0.040)
Diﬀ. in co 0.060 0.022 −0.067∗∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.733) (0.018) (0.013) (0.004)
Diﬀ. in udnet 0.159 0.072 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.422) (0.715) (0.756) (0.755) (0.750)
Diﬀ. in brr 0.036 0.047 -0.001 -0.001 0.010
(0.861) (0.823) (0.994) (0.994) (0.937)
MAXL −0.400∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.050) (0.581) (0.602) (0.668)
MAXK 0.083 0.073 -0.033 −0.033∗ -0.021
(0.568) (0.396) (0.106) (0.085) (0.249)
Bilateral trade -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.008 0.010
(0.952) (0.954) (0.143) (0.282) (0.159)
Dum EU -0.060 -0.097 0.055 0.055 0.048
(0.362) (0.139) (0.137) (0.143) (0.172)
TSC 0.517∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Diﬀ. in budget −0.019∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.096) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Diﬀ. in int. rate −0.025∗∗ -0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.007
(0.039) (0.987) (0.543) (0.579) (0.359)
Diﬀ. in serv. share -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.257) (0.747) (0.575) (0.547) (0.645)
Diﬀ. in Quinn’s index 0.001 0.002∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.256) (0.080) (0.623) (0.588) (0.614)
Cst −2.396∗∗ −1.583∗∗ 0.191 0.191 0.133
(0.011) (0.031) (0.112) (0.108) (0.219)
Obs. 635 635 635 635 635
R2 0.112 0.080 0.125 0.125 0.111
σ
2(b Y )
σ2(Y ) 0.4237 0.4012 0.1311 0.1311 0.1157
p-values in brackets, BR (Benchmark Results), TE (Time Eﬀect), FE (Fixed Eﬀect)
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
In columns IV and V, estimation is run by clustering observations by country pair
36Table 8: Exploring the role of interactions across LMI
Dependent variable: cross-country GDP correlation
Model I II III IV V
Diﬀ. in epl -0.070 -0.080 -0.075 -0.093 -0.082
(0.311) ( 0.238) ( 0.265) ( 0.174) ( 0.247)
Diﬀ. in tw -0.266 -0.504* -0.856*** -0.563* -0.783**
( 0.387) ( 0.100) ( 0.008) ( 0.060) ( 0.040)
Diﬀ. in co 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.037 0.033
( 0.623) ( 0.512) ( 0.752) ( 0.623) ( 0.681)
Diﬀ. in udnet -0.014 -0.001 0.149 -0.015 0.115
( 0.943) ( 0.997) ( 0.487) ( 0.941) ( 0.598)
Diﬀ. in brr 0.160 0.122 0.143 0.153 0.137
( 0.449) ( 0.575) ( 0.496) ( 0.493) ( 0.550)
Both epl rigid 0.258** 0.235**
( 0.026) ( 0.045)
Diﬀ. in tw*Both epl rigid -1.285** -1.164**
( 0.011) ( 0.026)
Both co low 0.074 0.093
( 0.670) ( 0.595)
Diﬀ. in tw*Both co low -0.041 -0.250
( 0.958) ( 0.751)
Both udnet high -0.110 -0.109
( 0.314) ( 0.325)
Diﬀ. in tw*Both udnet high 1.491** 1.478**
( 0.012) ( 0.015)
Both brr high -0.074 -0.091
( 0.414) ( 0.333)
Diﬀ. in tw*Both brr high 0.519 0.645
( 0.271) ( 0.192)
Both tw high -0.087
( 0.289)
MAXL -0.416** -0.451** -0.461** -0.430** -0.472**
( 0.035) ( 0.024) ( 0.020) ( 0.030) ( 0.018)
TSC2 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.517*** 0.525***
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
Diﬀ. in budget -0.019** -0.019** -0.020** -0.018* -0.020**
( 0.046) ( 0.048) ( 0.043) ( 0.066) ( 0.044)
Diﬀ. in int. rate -0.025** -0.022* -0.023* -0.022* -0.025**
( 0.043) ( 0.067) ( 0.057) ( 0.079) ( 0.043)
Cst -2.367** -2.542** -2.571** -2.387** -2.624**
( 0.035) ( 0.026) ( 0.022) ( 0.035) ( 0.022)
Obs. 610 610 610 610 610
R2 0.116 0.102 0.117 0.104 0.137
σ
2(b Y )
σ2(Y ) 0.429 0.419 0.421 0.430 0.444
p-values in brackets
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies included, not displayed
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